That's why the two governments are working on "common ground" in military interests. Not especially well written, but full of interesting tidbits about Indian defense and security matters. Argues for a U. Jul 08, Neeraj Kholiya rated it really liked it. A good read to understand issues with indian army Somebody rated it liked it Feb 13, Alexander Sanford rated it liked it Jul 22, Julian rated it really liked it Oct 26, Abhisar Singh rated it really liked it Sep 20, Rajbir Bhattacharjee rated it really liked it Aug 22, Joseph rated it it was ok Oct 01, Bhujan M rated it liked it Nov 03, Saikat rated it liked it Nov 20, Priyamvad Dubey rated it really liked it Jun 22, Atul rated it really liked it Jan 18, Prateek Roy rated it really liked it Mar 13, Ryan rated it it was amazing Mar 06, Satish Nagare rated it really liked it Aug 25, Prodipto rated it liked it Dec 02, Ruru Ghoshal rated it it was amazing Jun 23, Blake Whitaker rated it really liked it Jul 07, Arda Akbulut rated it really liked it May 04, Alexander Giles rated it really liked it Aug 17, Carlos rated it it was amazing Aug 15, Priyank rated it really liked it Apr 02, Saurabh rated it liked it Sep 14, Suyog Dalal rated it it was amazing Jul 12, Raghunath Seshadri rated it really liked it Sep 24, Vivek Seth rated it really liked it Feb 08, Nilesh rated it really liked it Mar 05, There are no discussion topics on this book yet.
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- Sunil Dasgupta & Stephen Philip Cohen, Military modernization in India.
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Additional Handling Charges are levied for other expenses incurred while delivering to your location. I Tanham attributed this missing piece to internal divisions in Indian society, which left a small elite responsible for strategic matters. Cut off from the rest of society, this elite was unable to mobilize available resources into military power. The result was repeated invasions of India over the last millennium.
India to spend a whopping USD 130 billion to modernise forces
Stephen Peter Rosen argued that internal social divisions in India prevented collective action necessary for strong defense. While it was possible for an independent government in India to do the same, a democratic India committed to egalitarian values and proper representation in the services would be hard-pressed to maintain a military set apart from the rest of society. In contrast, the Indian scholar Rajesh M. Basrur has emphasized political choices and ideological preferences.
Recent writing on India, drawing on the first period of sustained economic growth in the history of independent India, expects dramatic changes in how the country demonstrates its national power. It is expected that the Indian economy could grow at a rate of 7 to 8 percent for the next two decades.
If these expectations are borne out, there is little doubt that India will overtake cur- rent giants. Rodney Jones, for example, finds that between and India's ability to conduct combined arms operations against Pakistan improved dramatically, giving India a advantage in military capacity. B Ambassador Teresita Schaffer notes that India is dramatically changing its outlook toward the world and is envisioning itself as a world power, with an expanding economy and greater engagement in global governance.
In contrast, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz have emphasized threat over resources. Poor societies are quite capable of generating military power sufficient to frustrate and even defeat wealthier nations with bigger and better-equipped armies. In this view, India's nuclear tests were driven by its security concerns about the rising threats from Pakistan and China and established that India was willing to pay for the ability to secure its interests. On the other hand, richer societies may hold back their military spending to curb arms races; here politicians pursue political security rather than military power alone.
Both India's nonalignment and nuclear weapons programs, for example, have deviated from the predictions of the affluence theory. Its nonalignment during the cold war was the legacy of its colonial history and defined by its ability to playoff the United States and the Soviet Union.
Further, its nuclear program sought to preserve its nuclear options while trying not to antagonize other great powers. When the tests occurred in and , the circumstances were extraordinary.
ARMING WITHOUT AIMING: INDIAS MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Certainly, the testing decisions had little to do with India's affluence at the time. The preeminence of threat in determining the direction and content of military modernization is subject to debate as well.
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Over the last two decades, the military threat to-India has changed dramatically toward unconventional war, but the nation's armed forces and national security decision making structure appear not to have made insurgency and terrorism the centerpiece of the military modernization effort. Advanced conventional weapons such as fighter aircraft, tanks, and aircraft carriers heavily dominate India's wish list even though they have tenuous influence on the problems of insurgency and terrorism. Doctrinal changes have sought to extend conventional deterrence to sub-conventional conflict.
However, the prospects of extending deterrence to insurgency and terrorism and especially the difficulty the Indian Army has had in going from conventional war preparation to counterinsurgency and back demonstrates the difficulties of moving large organizations, especially without strong direction from the political leadership. Juli MacDonald has taken a critical view of the Indian military establishment, especially of the ability of the armed forces to modernize meaningfully. The American scholar Amit Gupta argues that the structural context of India's modernization efforts is critical.
Doctrinal development is erratic as the services scramble to fit their strategies to available weapons; their armed forces do not have the balance of the great powers. Meanwhile, at home regional powers have focused energies on unconventional technologies such as nuclear weapons to minimize the consequences of their weak conventional militaries.
Others have written mournfully or scornfully of the absence of creative Indian strategic thought, especially among civilians, returning to the theme explored by Tanham earlier. Former Indian defense and foreign minister Jaswant Singh says that unless India as a society comes together more effectively, it is unlikely to generate the requisite military power to pursue an active security policy. Indian scholar Harsh Pant argues that in the absence of strategic thinking, economic growth has become a surrogate for national strategy.
All of these explanations with their separate focuses—culture, society, political will, poverty, strategic environment-capture some of the truth. In our view India's deeply ingrained tradition of strategic restraint most powerfully explains the puzzling inability of the Indian state to generate sufficient military power to alter its strategic position vis-a-vis Pakistan or China. We see the restraint as deliberate, the result of Indian political leaders deciding that 1 the international environment was at least somewhat benign, or put another way, that India had the possibility of politically man- aging its threat; 2 the balance of resource allocation between defense and development had to favor the latter; and 3 there must be an ideological rejection of armed force as an instrument of state policy, a view stemming from the colonial experience and the great-power politics in which India became independent in While expensive and redundant, India's approach of arming without strategic purpose is not without wisdom.
The political preference of restraint has wisely sought to escape the security dilemma rather than embrace it. It is because of strategic restraint that other great powers in the world are facilitating, rather than fretting over, India's current rearmament, which is one of the biggest peacetime efforts by any developing country in recent history. But strategic restraint also contributes to the astounding lack of political direction in Indian efforts at military modernization.
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India's most eminent strategic thinker, K. Subrahmanyam, has spent most of his career pleading for modernization of the defense and strategic policy process.
While Subrahmanyam has strong interests in weapons modernization he was the leading advocate for many years of going nuclear , much of his wrath has been directed at the antiquated system by which India formulates strategic policy, makes weapons decisions, and manages the entire defense policy process. India's armed forces have long disagreed with strategic restraint as a viable position in defense policy. The country's rapidly growing strategic community would like to use India's newfound affluence and access to technology to achieve military transformation, but there is tension here and it is not clear that the new forces of change will prevail.
On the one hand, India's new affluence and the nuclear tests of raise hopes that the country will break out of its strategic restraint-and assume its place as a great power. The haphazard character of military change in India suggests that the country's historical preference for strategic restraint remains firmly in place.